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and the question of natural evolution. To what extent this
development is compatible with ‘a culturalist approach that has put
emphasis on human agency and symbolic language . . . remains to be
seen’ (p. 80).
Overall, Arcangeli has written an up-to-date and lucid introduction
to cultural history. The scope of the book, and the variety of
approaches and orientations included, is impressive, even more so
when taking into account the very concise character of the book. The
book is also well translated; in this respect, the editors of Routledge are
to be credited.
Cultural History: A Concise Introduction is a welcome contribution to
the current state of literature on cultural history. I recommend the
book to anyone interested in cultural history, yet especially to teachers
of undergraduate courses who would like to acquaint their students
with basic though accurate knowledge of cultural history.
Steven Schouten
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy
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Nicholas Mirzoeff (2011), The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality,
Durham: Duke University Press.
More than a decade ago, in his An Introduction to Visual Culture,
Mirzoeff expressed his plan to ‘mark out a broad trajectory for the
emergence of contemporary visuality.’ From the outset he made it
clear that he envisaged not so much a historical reconstruction of
visual culture than a Foucaultian-type genealogy which aimed at a
‘strategic reinterpretation of the history of modern visual media
understood collectively, rather than fragmented into disciplinary units
such as film, television, art and video’.1 These few sentences indicate
well the magnitude of Mirzoeff’s ambitions while also aptly describing
the breadth and nature of the critical ‘genealogy’ that The Right to Look
offers. The qualification ‘strategic’ accurately suggests a grand-scale
project that is global in scope, eminently transgeneric and
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interdisciplinary, and takes the broad perspective of the longue dure´e
(the past four hundred years of world history, starting with the age of
the slave trade). This intellectual project for which the basis was laid
more than a decade ago has now come to fruition. At the same time, it
can still be regarded as work-in-progress. Partly due to its vast compass,
its fairly open key concepts (visuality and countervisuality), and its
abrupt ending (no conclusion), The Right to Look can be considered as
an unfinished book, albeit a very stimulating one. It is a book with an
open architecture that begs to be engaged with: to see its empirical
scope extended even more, its case studies deepened, and its
conceptual framework challenged.
By taking the writings of the Scottish historian Thomas
Carlyle (1795–1881) as his entry point into the subject matter of the
book, the author starts in media res. Carlyle was a conservative anti-
abolitionist whose somewhat reactionary ideas about heroic moral
and intellectual leadership Mirzoeff takes as representative of the
‘plantation complex’ which spans a period from the second half of the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century. ‘Complexes’ are historically
overlapping discursive formations that can best be understood as
distinctive configurations of governmentality including technologies of
differentiation and ordering: scopic regimes which empower as much
as regiment people’s identifications and life projects. By the time
Carlyle published his ideas about the enlightened panoptical hero, the
subsequent ‘complex’, that of ‘empire’, was already born out of the
French and Haitian revolutions. It comprises the period of imperial
expansion, colonial occupation as well as the Third Reich. This
was followed by what Mirzoeff calls the present-day ‘military-industrial
complex’, which begins in the aftermath of WWI and lasts until today.
For each of the three complexes Mirzoeff distinguishes two sides,
the hegemonic and the counterhegemonic side, as well as two forms
or epochs: the standard form followed by the intensified form. So,
for instance, the aforementioned Carlyle is situated in the (second)
intensified form of the (first) plantation complex and finds himself,
not surprisingly given his conservative views, on the hegemonic side
of full-grown ‘visuality’. The latter notion can best be explained
in relation to its neighbouring counterparts, forms and complexes.
Within the plantation complex, the ‘visuality’ associated with Carlyle
follows and intensifies the earlier moment of what Mirzoeff calls
‘oversight’. In this earlier moment, the organisation of labour, people,
and natural resources is directed by the emblematic figure of the
overseer who embodies a cluster of techniques of surveillance and
management of which maps and tables are the most critical. In its later,
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intensified form ‘visuality’ bureaucratises, enshrines and localises the
inequalities in spite of increasing leakages both local (runaways,
maroons) and translocal (the interpenetration of colony and
metropole). These processes soon give way to the imperial complex
which resembles more strongly Bentham’s and Foucault’s panopticism.
The imperial governmentality is a centralised and segregationist
system that prevails over the preceding Carlylian status quo by
envisaging change in conduct and advancement (according to
imposed norms). On the counterhegemonic side, the prototypical
plantation overseer is contested by the revolutionary antislavery heroes
of the likes of Toussaint Louverture, while the late plantation complex
sees its visuality contested, reworked or veiled by what Mirzoeff labels
‘abolition realism’. This encompasses very diverse imagery produced by
metropolitan artists such as the Danish-French Jewish painter Camille
Pissarro or the American photographer Henry Moore, which shows
traces or, indeed, ellipses of the emergent ‘modern’ post-slavery
condition: the absence of slave figures in places where they almost
certainly occurred could be as telling as their conspicuous appearances.
In this way the author works his way through a multitude of both
well-known careers and sometimes far lesser-known visual, graphic or
textual materials, via the colonial and WWII period, to the post-1989
period. Here post-panoptic visuality is the key element of what the
author labels present-day ‘global counterinsurgency’. Although
diachronically structured, Mirzoeff’s long trajectory of western/global
visuality is never a unilinear story, but a multidimensional one
punctuated by analytical digressions or other side-steps, for instance
in the form of ‘counterpoints’. These are very focused mini chapters
which reframe some of the material presented in the preceding
chapter. In addition, The Right to Look offers several unexpected
intersections, such as for instance the association of W.E.B. Du Bois
and Antonio Gramsci in the way they construed ‘the south’ as
vantage point of global liberation from fascism and (later on) anti-
decolonisation repression. His discussion of the Algerian war in this
context is subtly interspersed with a wealth of fascinating imagery
and documents both historical and contemporary. When, eventually,
the author cites a communist journalist claiming that the
decolonisation struggle in Algeria was not a battle ‘only a gigantic
police operation’, he announces the advent of the modern post-
panoptical condition which combines extreme forms of (often digital)
visualisation (e.g. computer warfare) with new strategies of optical
invisibility through chaotic, informal or under-the-radar operations
and surveillance – Mirzoeff does not use the word ‘sousveillance’.
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Even though the long trajectory of visuality is punctuated
by violence, punishment, repression and war, these aspects are
highlighted consistently only in the author’s treatment of global
counterinsurgency. The instrumentarium of counterinsurgency is that
of anti-visibility, disguise, and omnipresence, its main actors are
‘terrorists’, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), mobile or static
surveillance cameras which operate in domestic zones as much as in
far-away territories. We are told, for instance, that on a yearly basis
the United States spends $32 billion on ‘invisible’ state operations
which range from interrogation and torture by state actors (in the
persona of ‘Other Government Agency’) to precision killings by
drones. When considering the omnipresence and pervasiveness of
the current ‘neovisuality’, the author emphasises how the ‘permanent
war’ has become more cultural than political and has insinuated
itself into people’s everyday lives. For Mirzoeff, democracy and
education may lead us out of this predicament. An equally vague but
nonetheless challenging final suggestion is the need to ‘reclaim,
rediscover, and retheorize the practices and spaces of everyday life’, in
order to resist its inherent militarization.
It should be clear from these impressions that The Right to Look
covers a vast amount of ground, offers forceful conceptual tools (such
as ‘complex’ and ‘visuality’) as well as meticulous and often extremely
well-documented fine-grained analysis. However, all this turns it also
into a very risky undertaking. For one, a clear-cut division between
hegemonic and counterhegemonic visuality may be heuristically
productive, but it runs the risk of dichotomization where a strong
argument can be made in favour of complicity, polysemy and
articulations (cf. Stuart Hall) – notions which fit better the more
processual ‘search for hegemony’.2
Furthermore, as indicated above, the different units of analysis
are very unequally distributed over the different chapters. While
‘oversight’, i.e. the first form (‘standard’) of the first complex
(‘plantation’) of one side (the hegemonic) is treated extensively
in one whole chapter (one), the last chapter (seven) covers the
entire ‘military-industrial’ complex in both its forms and from both
its (counter)hegemonic sides. Because the scope of each chapter
increases steadily from chapter five onwards, one gets the impression
that the author was running out of material to proportionately
document the different units of his grand scheme. Moreover, the
absence of a concluding chapter endorses the feeling that in the end
the author also ran out of time. Although this odd repartition does not
jeopardise the coherence nor the consistency of the book, it does not
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mean that there are no blind spots or truncated analyses. An example
of the former is the fact that the visual language of evolutionism is
almost entirely left out in the treatment of the imperial (colonial)
visuality complex (nineteenth to twentieth century). However, the
spatiotemporal mapping of human, animal, and artefactual diversity
on a global scale bespeaks evolutionism’s elemental panoptical nature.
Moreover, evolutionism was a multimodal discourse par excellence,
comprising a wide range of graphic and visual manifestations (from
skull measurements to evolutionary charts for particular species or
artefacts), performances (human zoos), and institutions (museums
and universal exhibitions). It is difficult to imagine why all this was left
out, even if it was not (re)analysed in detail.
Mirzoeff’s summary treatment of the material in his later chapters,
however, is not without danger. This is clear for instance from the
curtailed analysis of the well-known photographs taken and distributed
from within the American-Iraqi prison at Abu Ghraib. About these
snap shots, Mirzoeff merely tells us that they served to frighten off
potential insurgents although they were probably circulated by
accident. Quite disappointingly, this is not even the beginning of an
analysis in a book and a chapter that delves deeply into the messiness
and the complex entanglements of post-panoptical visuality. Given
Mirzoeff’s interest and familiarity with the Abu Ghraib case, this could
have been presented as a case in point.3 Gourevitch and Morris for one
claim that some of the soldiers-photographers took these pictures
either to protect themselves against future accusations of torture or as
evidence of their strenuous working environment in view of future
claims of post-traumatic stress disorder compensations.4 In order to
enhance the social deixis of the photographs-as-evidence in future
court cases, soldiers chose to take part in the scenes. At the same time,
their smiling faces and thumbs-up gestures softened the evidential
nature of the pictures whose authors/actors tried not to alarm
colleagues and superiors by giving them the appearance of casual
snapshots. Apart from illustrating the intricacies of mass-mediated
counter-counterinsurgency – a point made by Mirzoeff – this case
could also signal the messy entanglements of the hegemonic and the
counterhegemonic,5 an operation which could certainly be
accommodated by if not enriching Mirzoeff’s formidable book.
Karel Arnaut
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity,
Go¨ttingen
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Joanna Bourke (2011), What it Means to be Human: Reflections from 1791
to the Present, London: Virago.
Joanna Bourke’s new book engages with one of the most urgent
questions facing contemporary culture. In the face of rapid
technological change, human identity is becoming increasingly
uncertain. This book is concerned particularly with ‘the unknowability
of all animals’ (p. 16) and how definitions of the human have tended to
deploy the language of rights in distinguishing the human from the
animal. ‘What it means to be human’ is becoming increasingly
uncertain in ways unimaginable at the beginning of the twentieth
century. The book cover image harks back to the seventeenth century,
foregrounding the human (specifically female)-animal categories.
The three graces in Rubens’ painting appear in a collage: women
above the waist and animal below. Bourke takes as her starting point an
argument for women’s rights expressed in a letter from ‘An Earnest
Englishwoman’ (1872) using a comparison between the treatment of
animals and women. The Earnest Englishwoman audaciously argued
for women to be treated at least as favourably as animals. Typical of
Bourke’s approach, previously seen in her books on Rape, Fear and
Dismembering the Male, this book covers an impressive range of material,
situating it in a broad cultural historical framework. In juxtaposing
often unexpected but illuminating examples, new questions emerge.
Here she takes the reader through some familiar terrain (Descartes,
Bentham, Wollstonecraft) but selects some unexpected reference
points to expand the field of study and set in motion other possible
lines of enquiry.
Bourke reassesses ideas about the human, noting that the
distinctions between the human and the animal tend to be both
volatile and violent. References are made from the outset to Giorgio
Agamben, Jacques Derrida and Catharine MacKinnon. Bourke
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